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Perversity as Rationality in Teacher Evaluation
Scott R. Bauries
Introduction
Rational basis review is broken. Consider a vignette:
Imagine a student, Lisa, who is about to graduate high school.
Lisa has already completed all of the graduation course
requirements early and is spending her time during her senior
year taking interesting electives and dual-enrollment college
courses. The state has a statute that requires school districts to
deny a diploma to any student “who, during the final year of
school attendance, fails to achieve a passing score on the stateapproved, end-of-course exams in the courses of Language Arts,
Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies in which that student
is then-currently enrolled.”
As part of the graduation requirements, schools must
administer these “end-of-course” exams in the twelfth grade to
every student enrolled in one of the aforementioned courses. It
forbids early administration of the tests under any
circumstances, due to concerns over cheating and test security.
However, because Lisa took online courses in the summers, and
completed her last graduation-required course in the eleventh
grade, she took no end-of-course test then, and she will take no
such test this year, as she is not enrolled in any graduationrequired course. Thus, by operation of the mandate, Lisa will
“fail to achieve a passing score” in all of the required subjects
and will accordingly fail to graduate.
When Lisa and her parents notice this anomaly and inform
the school district, the response is to quote the policy to them,
and to express regret that Lisa will apparently not graduate.
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Obviously unsatisfied, Lisa’s parents take Lisa’s issue up the
chain of command, all the way to the Superintendent’s Office.
The Superintendent, recognizing the absurdity of the situation,
offers a solution. A random student from Lisa’s graduating
class will be selected, and Lisa’s graduation requirement will be
held satisfied if, and only if, that student passes all of the end-ofcourse exams.
Would that seem absurd or arbitrary?
How about
irrational?
Thankfully, no school district has such an arbitrary
requirement, but what if one did? Would that pass muster in a
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause? Under current approaches, the answer would likely be
yes. Focusing on a teacher evaluation plan in Florida, this
contribution to the Symposium considers why this is, critiques
that state of affairs, and offers the beginnings of a way forward,
which, as it turns out, is somewhat a call for a way backward in
Constitutional Law.

I. Teacher Evaluation Practices over Time
A. Historical Approaches to Teacher Evaluation
For most of the 350-year history of public education in the
United States and the Colonies, 1 teachers were not evaluated for
1. Public education began in earnest with the Massachusetts Colony’s “Old Deluder
Satan Law” of 1647, which provided:
It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the
knowledge of the Scriptures, as in former times keeping them in an unknown
tongue, so in these later times by perswading [sic] from the use of tongues,
that so at least the true sense and meaning of the originall [sic] might be
clowded [sic] by the false glosses of Saint-seeming deceivers; and that
Learning may not be buried in the grave of our fore-fathers in Church and
Commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors: It is therefore ordered by
this Court and Authoritie [sic] thereof; that every Township in this
Jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty
Householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all
such children as shall resort to him to write and read, whose wages shall be
paid either by the Parents or Masters of such children, or by the Inhabitants
in general, by way of supply, as the major part of those that order the
prudentials of the Town shall appoint. Provided those which send their
children be not oppressed by paying much more than they can have them
taught for in other towns.
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pedagogical performance or effectiveness. 2 Just before the turn
of the Twentieth Century, policy makers and theorists became
interested in evaluating teachers. Evaluative practices split into
those favoring democratic participation and those favoring
scientific approaches—the latter were the first to employ
standardized tests and other results-based data, but only
crudely. 3 During the period from the 1960s through the
millennium, most teachers have been (and still are) evaluated, at
least in part, through personal observations and rating rubrics,
usually based on one or more class visits per year by an
administrator or a fellow teacher. 4 This method of evaluating
teachers was always subject to legitimate objections, as it is in
the ordinary business context. Primarily, these objections
centered upon bias, as the evaluations in question were usually
the responsibility of one administrator.5
In the 1980s and 1990s, following the publication of the
Reagan Administration’s educational call-to-arms, A Nation at
Risk,6 policy makers became more interested in evaluating
teachers as a means to improve schools, specifically through
“merit pay,” or pay-for-performance schemes.7 In the late
And it is further ordered, that where any town shall increase to the
number of one hundred Families or Householders, they shall set up a
Grammar-School, the Masters thereof being able to instruct youth so far as
they may be fitted for the Universitie [sic]. And provided if any town neglect
the performance hereof above one year then everie [sic] such town shall pay
five pounds per annum to the next such School, till they shall perform this
order.
Old
Deluder
Satan
Law
of
1647,
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/ob/deludersatan.pdf?_ga=2.88969755.127
2435236.1551892292-657769494.1551892292 [https://perma.cc/ST6N-D63V] (last visited
Mar. 29, 2019); see generally Eric R. Ebeling, Massachusetts Education Laws of 1642,
1647, and 1648, in HIST. DICTIONARY AM. EDUC. 225, 225-26 (Richard J. Altenbaugh ed.,
1999).
2. See generally ROBERT J. MARZANO ET AL., EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION :
SUPPORTING THE ART AND SCIENCE OF TEACHING 12-29 (Deborah Siegel ed., 2011)
(outlining the history of educational employee supervision and evaluation).
3. Id. at 14.
4. Id. at 28.
5. Arthur E. Wise et al., Teacher Evaluation: A Study of Effective Practices, 86 THE
ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 60, 71 (1985).
6. NAT’L COMM ’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
7. See THERESA J. GURL ET. AL., P OLICY, PROFESSIONALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION,
AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 12 (2016); Wise et al., supra note 5, at 60.
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1990s, and especially in the 21st Century, many states began
using the standardized test scores of students, at least in part, to
evaluate teachers on the theory that teachers should be
accountable for students’ results.8 At its inception, there were
many obvious problems with this idea. The existing tests were
mostly designed for diagnostic—not evaluative—purposes, and
few policy makers appropriately considered the many factors
unrelated to teaching that might influence scores, such as
poverty, family structure, race, family education levels, school
safety, attendance, and the like. 9
Measurement experts, psychologists, and statisticians
worked for years to account for these problems so that teachers
could be evaluated fairly based on their students’ performance.
Ultimately, they developed the highly controversial, but now
widely used, technique of value-added modeling.10

B. Value-Added Modeling
Value-added modeling describes a group of highly complex
statistical techniques that researchers and evaluators use to
attempt to isolate the influence of an independent variable on the
positive and negative changes in a dependent variable—in other
words, to determine the “value” that the independent variable
“adds” to the dependent variable.11 When used for evaluating
teachers, the independent variable is the performance
effectiveness of the teacher in the classroom, and the dependent
variable is the achievement of the evaluated teacher’s students,
as reflected in their standardized test scores.
Value-added models, such as the Florida model analyzed in
the next section, use the prior performance of students on oneto-several years of standardized tests, among other factors, to

8. MARZANO ET AL., supra note 2, at 25.
9. See Edward Haertel, The Valid Use of Student Performance Measures for Teacher
Evaluation, 8 EDUC. EVALUATION & P OL’Y ANALYSIS 45, 46-50 (1986) (outlining the
pitfalls of student test results for teacher evaluation).
10. See Douglas F. Warring, Teacher Evaluations: Use or Misuse?, 3 UNIVERSAL J.
OF EDUC. RES. 703, 704 (2015) (situating the development of value-added modeling within
the overall teacher evaluation debate).
11. See id. at 705 (“[V]alue-added model based on value added measures attempt to
isolate the impact a teacher has on students’ achievement from other factors of interest,
such as student characteristics.”).
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compute an expected learning gain that each student should be
able to accomplish in each subsequent testing year.12 Then, for
each student, the model computes the current-year test score that
would be predicted based on one or more prior years of test
scores, while attempting to control for student and school
characteristics that are known to influence achievement, and
compares the current–year test score actually obtained to that
prediction to determine whether the actual score was higher or
lower than what the model predicted it would be. 13
As discussed above, the use of standardized test scores to
evaluate teaching performance has always been controversial.
Critics have objected to it for many reasons, including that
standardized tests often measure only a narrow portion of what
we hope students learn in school, and that they generally do so
using the least expensive means—usually machine-scored
multiple-choice questions—when other methods, such as essay
or performance assessment, would be better aligned with the
essential knowledge and skills we hope students will acquire in
school.14
These problems, however, pale in comparison to the
unfairness that results when student scores on standardized tests
are directly imputed to schools and teachers as measures of
educational quality, without controlling for other factors that
may cause differences in scores.15 Empirical research has
established that, at most, between one and fourteen percent of
the variation in student test scores can be attributed to the
effectiveness of the teacher who taught the tested students in the

12. See Florida Value-Added Technical Report, Dkt. 86-2, Ex. 13C, at 2-3, Cook v.
Stewart, No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2014) [hereinafter Fla. Tech. Rep.].
13. OLIVIA LITTLE ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EVALUATING TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS 4 (Nat’l Ctr. For Tchr. Quality 2009); see generally LAURA GOE ET AL.,
APPROACHES TO EVALUATING TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS (Nat’l
Comprehensive Ctr. For Tchr. Quality 2008) (discussing varying approaches to evaluating
teacher effectiveness, including value-added).
14. Expert Report of Edward Henry Haertel, Dkt. 86-13, at ¶ 53, Cook v. Stewart,
No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2014) [hereinafter Haertel Rep.].
15. See, e.g., W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure
Educational Quality, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8, 8-15 (1999) (outlining the inherent flaws in
using standardized tests as measures of educational quality without controlling for other
factors).
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subject being evaluated.16 This means that anywhere from 86 to
99 percent of the variation in student test scores is the result of
factors other than the effectiveness of the teacher. Therefore, it
would clearly be irrational to judge teaching performance, and
then hold the teacher accountable for that performance, based on
the test scores of a teacher’s students without first controlling for
all of those other causal factors, none of which lie within the
evaluated teacher’s control.
Statisticians and measurement experts are certainly not
blind to this concern, nor are school leaders. Value-added
modeling was initially conceived as a way of addressing this
causation problem by statistically controlling for measured
factors other than teaching performance, such as student prior
performance, incoming language ability, socioeconomic status,
race, and school characteristics, and thereby isolating the
performance of a specific teacher as the cause of an identified
learning gain. 17 Nevertheless, even with such controls, the use
of value-added modeling remains quite controversial, mostly
due to concerns over its validity and reliability.
“Validity” is a measurement term referring to “the
usefulness of information that a test provides for decisions that
need to be made.”18 In other words, concern over validity is a
concern over the appropriateness of the inferences one seeks to
draw, or the actions one seeks to take, based on the scores that a
measurement yields. For example, even the best and most
carefully calibrated weight scale will provide a poor—or
invalid—measure of height. Weight and height are positively,
but not perfectly, correlated. Thus, using a weight scale to
measure height does provide some useful information, but to
validly measure height, one needs a tool that is more directly
reflective of height, such as a ruler or tape measure. Because
many factors other than teaching influence student performance,
some of which significantly, assessing validity in the context of
value-added models is challenging. When many factors in
16. AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, ASA STATEMENT ON USING VALUE ADDED
MODELS
FOR
EDUCATIONAL
ASSESSMENT
(2014),
https://www.amstat.org/asa/files/pdfs/POL-ASAVAM-Statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FF9Q-HXBF].
17. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 8.
18. Nancy Koh et al., Understanding Validity Issues Surrounding Test-Based
Accountability Measures in the US, 22 QUALITY ASSURANCE IN EDUC. 42, 44-45 (2014).
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addition to the construct the evaluator is interested in affect a
variable, the factors other than the construct need to be
“controlled.”19
The main purpose of value-added modeling is therefore to
isolate the teaching performance of a particular teacher in
driving student achievement by controlling for measurable
factors other than teaching that contribute to student
achievement.20 But some factors are very difficult to control
for.21 Among these are the validity and/or reliability of the
underlying standardized tests used to judge student achievement,
nonrandom assignment of students to teachers, 22 and summer
learning loss, if a model uses a prior year’s assessment as a pretest.23 Thus, even the most carefully designed value-added
models suffer from validity concerns. 24
Aside from concerns over validity, which can be minimized
(though never eliminated) through careful model design and
implementation, another problem with value-added models is
their very low “reliability.” 25 Reliability is a measurement term
used to describe the consistency of a test in measuring the same
construct from one administration to the next.26 For example,
though a weight scale is obviously a valid measure of weight,
for the scale to be a reliable measure of weight, it must read “10
pounds” when a 10-pound weight is placed on it, and it must do
so every time the same weight is placed on it. If it reads “10
pounds” the first time, and then “4 pounds” the second time for
the same object, then the scale is not a reliable measure of
weight.

19. Matthew Johnson et al., Sensitivity of Teacher Value-Added Estimates to Student
and Peer Control Variables, 2 (Mathematica Policy Research, Working Paper No. 25,
2013).
20. Id. at 2.
21. Preston C. Green et al., The Legal and Policy Implications of Value-Added
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 1, 6 (2012).
22. LITTLE ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
23. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 25.
24. LITTLE ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
25. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 6-7; Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 44.
26. Green et al., supra note 21, at 6.
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In measurement scholarship, reliability is measured using a
coefficient, the value of which can range from zero to one.27 A
value of one indicates perfect reliability—a scale that reads “10
pounds” every time the 10-pound bowling ball is placed on it. A
score of zero indicates no reliability—a scale that might read
literally any value each time the same 10-pound bowling ball is
placed on it.
Scholarship has established that the reliability of valueadded model scores from year to year ranges between .2 to .3—
or what would be considered very low reliability—not much
better than chance.28 By way of comparison, well-known
standardized tests such as the SAT and the ACT typically have
reliability coefficients on the order of .8 to .9.29 It would not be
rational for a decision maker seeking to come to a defensible
decision—especially an important one—to rely on an instrument
with very low reliability. In fact, as a recent study put it,
“[c]oefficients at or above 0.80 are often considered sufficiently
reliable to make decisions about individuals based on their
observed scores, although a higher value, perhaps 0.90, is
preferred if the decisions have significant consequences.” 30
Because value-added modeling is used to evaluate teachers for
the purposes of promotion, tenure, and potentially even
dismissal, reliability is a major concern.
To better understand how weak these value-added model
reliability coefficients are, the authors of one study divided the
teachers evaluated into quintiles and tracked the stability of their

27. See Noreen M. Webb et al., Reliability Coefficients and Generalizability Theory
in HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, VOL. 26, 81-120 (C.R. Rao & S. Sinharay eds., 2007)
(explaining reliability coefficients and their purposes).
28. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 7 (the year-to-year correlation is .2 to .3);
Daniel F. McCaffrey et al., The Intertemporal Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4
EDUC. FIN & P OL’Y 572, 588 (2009) (year-to-year correlations range from 0.2 to 0.5 for
elementary school and 0.3-0.7 for middle school).
29. See, e.g., ACT, INC., The ACT Technical Manual tbl.10.2.1 (2017),
http://www.act.org/content/dam/act/unsecured/documents/ACT_Technical_Manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8J6-2N99]; see also THE COLLEGE BOARD, Test Characteristics of the
SAT:
Reliability,
Difficulty
Levels,
Completion
Rates
1
(2013),
http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/Test-Characteristics-of-SAT2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/32V7-BXCG].
30. Webb et al., supra note 27, at 81.
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ratings placement from quintile to quintile over two years. 31
They found that teachers who scored in the top quintile one year
were just as likely to find themselves in one of the bottom two
quintiles the next year as they were to find themselves in the top
quintile again. 32 Such large changes in ratings from year to year
indicate that the value-added model studied (a precursor to
Florida’s current model, discussed in the next section) was very
imprecise, or unreliable. 33 Such instability alone should cause
concern in legislatures considering using value-added modeling
for high-stakes decisions, especially where (as is true three
states) the model accounts for half of the teacher’s rated
effectiveness.34
Despite these flaws, it is accepted by a portion of the
scholarly community that, when meticulously constructed and
used as designed, a value-added model can provide enough
useful information over time to justify using model-derived
ratings, but only as one element among others of the overall
evaluation of a teacher. Much skepticism remains over uses,
such as the one described below, that assign 50 percent of a
teacher’s effectiveness rating to a value-added model, and then
attach significant consequences to that rating.35 Because valueadded models are often used to evaluate individual teachers for
job-related benefits and consequences, critical to defending such
uses is designing a model that clearly and unambiguously
isolates one teacher’s influence on student learning.36 As
discussed below, Florida’s most recent value-added assessment
program as applied in four individual school districts not only

31. McCaffrey et al., supra note 28, at 574 (citing Cory Koedel & Julian R. Betts,
Re-Examining the Role of Teacher Quality in the Educational Production Function (Univ.
of Missouri-Columbia, Working Paper No. 708, 2007)).
32. Id. at 574-75.
33. Green et al., supra note 21, at 6-7.
34. See id. at 3-5 (describing three state programs that base 50 percent or more of the
teacher rating on value-added models).
35. Id. at 21-22.
36. See ERIN D. LOMAX & JEFFREY J. KUENZI., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4105,
VALUE-ADDED MODELING FOR TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 4 (2012) (“VAM recognizes
that there are multiple factors that contribute to learning and is therefore designed with the
intention of isolating the teacher’s effect on student learning. The ‘teacher effect’ is an
estimate of the teacher’s unique contribution to student achievement as measured by
student performance on assessments.”).
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fell short of, but also actively worked against, this critical
consideration that underlies all value-added modeling.

II. Florida’s Experiment with Value-Added Modeling
This section reviews the recent effort of teacher groups to
challenge the teacher evaluation system in Florida, as applied in
four public school districts. This unsuccessful challenge
illustrates the perverse policy incentives and results that the
modern approach to rational basis review yields.

A. Value-Added Modeling in Florida
Like several other states, mostly in response to an Obamaera competitive federal funding program called Race to the
Top,37 Florida opted to evaluate its public school teachers using
value-added modeling. Under the legislation requiring this form
of evaluation, at least one-third of a teacher’s “effectiveness”
score, which has implications for retention, remediation, and
salary increases, must be based on a value-added model score of
that teacher’s effectiveness. 38
Like all teacher evaluation systems that employ valueadded modeling, Florida’s system is designed to isolate one
teacher’s influence on the testing performance of that teacher’s
students.39 It does so by collecting the students’ scores on the
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (the “FCAT”) in
reading in grades 3 through 10 and mathematics in grades 3
through 8, and computing a score for each student that reflects
the difference between what that student’s prior performance
would have predicted, and what the student actually achieved. 40
Once all of these scores are computed, they are combined with
each other, and a series of statistical controls are then applied to
account for non-teaching factors that could have influenced
learning gains or losses. 41 The resulting score is then further
37. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 21, at 1 n.2.
38. FLA. STAT. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1); see also Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 11.
39. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 1.
40. See Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1210 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (describing the
program’s details as part of a challenge to its constitutionality).
41. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 3-4. According to the State’s technical report,
these factors include each student’s prior test scores; the number of courses in the tested
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controlled for the overall achievement levels of the school’s
student body, in a laudable effort to capture societal and
community effects.42
Once the model controls for these factors, a large portion of
the variance in test scores, and therefore a large portion of the
gains or losses in achievement among the teacher’s students,
will have been accounted for by the controlled non-teaching
factors. Importantly, all the residual portion of the student
learning gains not accounted for by these controlled factors is
then assumed to be caused by the teaching performance of the
teacher who taught the tested students in the tested subject.43 In
other words, even when used as designed, the Florida ValueAdded Model does not arrive at a direct conclusion, but an
indirect one based on the existence of a residual student gain not
accounted for by the controlled non-teaching factors.44 Put
differently, it assumes that student achievement not caused by
the non-teaching factors specified in the model was caused
entirely by the individual teacher’s effective or ineffective
performance.
Such an assumption depends heavily on the further
assumption that all relevant non-teacher-specific factors have
been adequately accounted for in the model, but some outside
factors are impossible to control in any statistical model of this
type. 45 For example, as outlined above, scholars have identified
“peer effects”—the increases and decreases in learning growth
that a student experiences by being placed in classes with strong
or weak students—as a factor that value-added modeling has
trouble controlling for.46 Additionally, in Florida, because the
value-added model compares the scores of students at the end of
subject that each student takes; each student’s disabilities (if any); each student’s ability to
speak and read English; whether each student is gifted; each student’s attendance record;
the mobility of each student from school to school during the school year; the tendency of
students to be promoted to the next grade after one year; the size of the class each student
is in for the tested subject; and the existing differences, or variance, in test scores among
the students in the tested class. Id.
42. Id. at 4-6.
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id.
45. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 23.
46. NAT ’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & NAT ’L ACAD. OF EDUC., GETTING VALUE OUT
OF VALUE ADDED : REPORT OF A W ORKSHOP 46 (Henry Braun, Naomi Chudowsky &
Judith Koenig eds., 2010).
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one academic year to the scores of those same students at the
end of another academic year, it cannot control for learning
losses that occur over the summer, and this failure to control has
a disparate impact based on both race and socioeconomic
status.47
In the absence of an adequate control for summer learning
loss, for example, a teacher of reading or math will be held
responsible for such loss, even though she lacks any ability to
prevent it because she will not even meet the tested students in
question until after the learning loss happens. In short, there is a
significant concern that, even when used as designed, valueadded models such as Florida’s may be measuring the influence
of factors confounded with the factor they attempt to isolate—
teacher effectiveness. In measurement terms, value-added
models such as the one used by Florida therefore may not be
valid measures of teaching quality. 48
Two other major problems affect value-added modeling in
general. One is the problem of what scholars term “spillover
effects”—the unmeasurable, but real, effects that a team of
teachers teaching the same students can have on each other’s
students.49 The other is the impossibility of deriving any sort of
value-added rating for teachers who either do not teach the
tested material, or do not teach any material in a tested grade.50
These problems existed in Florida’s model, as they do to a
certain extent in all value-added evaluation models. Efforts to
preserve the high-stakes use of value-added modeling for all
public school teachers at all costs, however, led Florida to
approve uses of the model directly in conflict with its purposes,
methods, and specifications, and, in one case, directly in conflict
with each other. These approved uses led to a judicial
challenge, which the next section explicates.

47. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 25.
48. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, this concern alone arguably should have
justified invalidation of the Model. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 404-06 (5th
Cir. 1981) (remanding for a showing that what was tested on a high school exit
examination was actually taught in Florida’s high schools).
49. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 10 (discussing “spillover effects”).
50. Id. at 14-15 (identifying this problem).
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B. Evaluating Teacher Evaluation in Florida
In Cook v. Stewart,51 later styled on appeal Cook v.
Bennett,52 a group of plaintiffs challenged the public school
teacher evaluation system outlined above, as applied in three
counties of the State. These three counties, with the State’s
approval, chose to account for the lack of usable scores for
teachers in some grade levels and subjects by attributing to those
teachers the test performance of students whom the evaluated
teachers either did not teach at all, or did not teach the tested
subjects.53
The District Court in Stewart entered judgment for the
State and the District defendants, based on two separate orders.54
Both of these orders held that the decision makers for each
defendant “could rationally believe” that the use of value-added
ratings computed from the test scores of one teacher’s students
to assign a performance rating to another teacher who did not
teach those students, and/or did not teach the tested subject,
furthered a state interest in improving student achievement.55
The remainder of this Part evaluates these conclusions.

1. Legislating or Mandating Internal Contradictions
The challenges to the programs in Florida sounded in both
substantive due process and equal protection, and accordingly,
the court applied rational basis review to evaluate their
constitutionality. 56 At a minimum, it would seem, even under
current approaches to rationality review of legislation, a law
should be invalidated if the means adopted to serve a legitimate
end are more likely to frustrate than serve the end, or if the
means are developed by experts and are put to a use that is

51. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
52. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
53. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1212.
54. See generally Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part State Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 17, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (No. 1:13-cv-72-MW-GRJ); Order
on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 17, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (No. 1:13cv-72-MW-GRJ).
55. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
56. Id. at 1212-14.
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directly contrary to the assumptions on which the experts
designed it.57 But this was not the case in Florida.
As introduced above, value-added modeling attempts to
address the many objections to the use of standardized test
scores to judge educational quality by isolating the effect of one
teacher on the standardized test scores of that teacher’s students,
in the subject or subjects that teacher teaches, while controlling
for the influence of other factors on such scores. Also as
outlined above, the assumption of the value-added model used in
Florida is that, once all of the non-teaching factors are controlled
for, all of the remaining non-random variation in student
achievement on the FCAT is attributable to the efficacy of the
student’s teacher with respect to the tested curriculum. So, the
Florida model’s design requires (1) accounting for all
measurable factors that might explain student performance,
other than the performance of the student’s teacher in the tested
curriculum; (2) assuming that all variation in student scores not
explained by those non-teaching factors was caused by the
student’s teacher in the tested curriculum; and then (3)
computing a rating for that teacher based on that residual portion
of student score gains, adjusted for overall student achievement
in the teacher’s school. 58 If one takes this model seriously, then
no additional causes of student achievement are possible.
Florida’s model takes its student test scores from the
annually administered FCAT, which tests reading in grades 3
through 10, and math in grades 3 through 8.59 No other scores
were used in the three defendant districts, so teacher evaluators
were presented with the two problems introduced above. 60 One
was how to assign ratings to teachers who teach in tested grades,
57. This was, in fact, arguably the controlling law on the books at the time in the
11th Circuit, as reflected in the substantive due process case, Debra P. v. Turlington, 644
F.2d 397, 404 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the court explained that “the state is obligated to
avoid action which is arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve or even frustrates a
legitimate state interest, or is fundamentally unfair.” The Eleventh Circuit, in Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as controlling precedent
the decisions of the 5th Circuit “as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down
by that court prior to close of business on that date.” Debra P. was decided on May 4,
1981, and rehearing denied on September 4, 1981, Debra P., 644 F.2d at 397, so it is
controlling 11th Circuit precedent, but the case is not mentioned in Stewart.
58. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 2-7.
59. Id. at 1.
60. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 15-16.
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but do not teach reading or math.61 The other was how to assign
ratings to teachers who do not teach any subject in one of the
tested grade levels. 62
To evaluate the uses to which Florida and the three districts
put the Florida model, and to illustrate how the school districts,
with the State’s approval, chose to address these problems, the
District Court divided the plaintiff teachers into two groups,
based on the circumstances that caused them to object to the use
of these computed scores to judge their teaching.63 What the
District Court termed “Type B” teachers were those who taught
students in grades in which the FCAT was administered, but
who did not teach any FCAT-tested curriculum to those
students—a seventh grade music teacher, for example. 64 What
the District Court termed “Type C” teachers were those who
taught in grades in which no students took the FCAT—
kindergarten through second grade, as well as eleventh and
twelfth grade—or in third grade, the year students take only the
baseline (first administration) test, thereby making the
computation of any student growth score impossible. 65
The districts computed value-added ratings for the Type B
teachers based on the reading FCAT scores of the students
whom the Type B teachers taught non-tested curricula, such as
music or science.66 For the Type C teachers, even this was not
possible, so the districts assigned each of these teachers a valueadded rating made up entirely of the portion of the variance in
test scores attributable to non-teaching factors at the teachers’
schools.67 Indeed, one of the school district defendants, Alachua
County Schools, even evaluated the teachers of one elementary
school that contained only grades kindergarten through second

61. Id. at ¶ 16.
62. Id. at ¶ 15.
63. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1210 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 16.
67. Id. at ¶ 15. As Dr. Haertel, the Appellants’ expert, explains, in two of the
Districts, the score was actually a combination of the school portion and the average of the
teacher portion for all of the teachers in the school, but since the teachers’ value-added
scores would have naturally roughly balanced each other out, the scores in these Districts
were actually nearly entirely a reflection of the school portion. Id. at ¶ 15, n.2.
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using the schoolwide test scores of the fourth and fifth grade
students of a completely different elementary school.68
It should be readily apparent that these uses were
completely antithetical to the methodological purpose of valueadded modeling, which at a minimum, seeks to isolate one
teacher’s influence on student performance. As to the Type B
teachers, assigning a value-added rating to a teacher who did not
teach the curriculum tested, while also attributing that same
residual variation in student scores after controlling for nonteaching factors to the teacher who actually did teach the tested
curriculum, contradicts the model’s specifications directly. The
model, recall, assumes that 100 percent of any residual variation
in student scores left once all control factors are accounted for is
caused by the teacher who taught the tested students in the tested
subject.69 But the approach the districts took with the Type B
teachers also attributed 100 percent of that same residual
variance to every Type B teacher in the school who taught the
same students.
Thus, the districts’ use of the model with Type B teachers
directly contradicted both the purpose of the model—to isolate
one teacher’s influence on student achievement—and the
model’s specifications. But worse than this, it had the effect of
holding one teacher responsible for the classroom performance
of another teacher not subject to the Type B teacher’s
supervision or control. Even assuming the existence of a
“spillover effect”70 that causes achievement effects across a
grade-level teaching team, any such effects were not subject to
the direct control of the Type B teacher and were therefore an
arbitrary means of rating that Type B teacher.
As to the Type C teachers, the use of the portion of student
score variance explained by non-teaching school factors
identified a covariate designed to control for school
characteristics, and to thereby make the individual teacher
ratings more accurate and valid by adjusting for between-school
differences, and instead used it as the sole determinant of
68. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law at 2, Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00072-MWGRJ).
69. Fla. Tech. Rep., supra note 12, at 6.
70. See Green et al., supra note 21, at 6 (discussing spillover effects).

2019

PERVERSITY AS RATIONALITY

341

whether a Type C teacher was performing well. In other words,
even though the central purpose of using a value-added model to
evaluate teaching employees is to isolate the influence of one
teacher’s performance on her student’s achievement, the ratings
of the Type C teachers isolated precisely nothing at the teacher
level.
Type C teachers were instead rated based on the overall
performance of students in the school who took the FCAT. No
attempt was made to isolate any influence that the Type C
teacher—or indeed, any other teacher—had on that
performance. Rather than separating effective from ineffective
teachers, then, the model as applied to Type C teachers rated
every single teacher in the same school who did not teach
FCAT-tested students or subjects as equally effective or
ineffective. Such a use, like the use to which the model was put
with the Type B teachers, was directly in conflict with both the
model’s purpose and design.
The State’s ostensible goal in adopting value-added
modeling as the basis for teacher evaluation statewide was
“increasing student success” (from the State’s summary
judgment brief), 71 or “increasing student learning growth”
(from the District Court’s opinion). 72 However, the State’s goal
would have been meaningless in the context of value-added
assessment unless the assumption underlying it was that, when
teachers receive lower value-added scores, they will respond to
those scores by taking action to improve their practices, thereby
improving student achievement and increasing their own valueadded ratings, in the hopes of both improving their practice and
avoiding negative consequences, such as dismissal. Basing the
value-added score for the Type B and Type C teachers on the
performance of students they either did not teach at all, or did
not teach the tested curriculum, instead based the score entirely
on matters that were outside the direct control or influence of the
teachers, leaving these teachers no way to respond to a bad score
to improve the achievement of the tested students.
The logic of the value-added system itself would contradict
this use. Recall that, under the State’s value-added model, all of
71. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207
(No. 1:13-cv-00072-MW-GRJ).
72. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1212.
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the residual score variation left over after the non-teaching
factors are accounted for was attributed to the student’s teacher
in the tested subject, logically meaning that, if we were to
believe the model, none of this residual variation was
attributable to any other cause, including the performance of any
other teacher. Were that not the case, it would have been
irrational to rate the teacher of the tested students in their tested
subject based on that residual—that’s the entire purpose of
value-added modeling, to control for factors other than the rated
teacher’s performance.73 Similarly, recall that the school’s
overall score was not connected to any particular teacher, but
was the State’s way of calibrating overall student achievement
levels in the school in the tested subjects to account for the
differences between schools as a control variable. So, neither of
these outcomes were subject to the influence or the control of
any Type B or Type C teacher. In short, there was literally
nothing any Type B or Type C teacher could have done
purposely to improve their own teaching in response to their
value-added ratings, because neither the Type B ratings nor the
Type C ratings contained any useful information about these
teachers’ own teaching performance.
To illustrate, under the uses of the value-added model
adopted by the districts and approved by the State, if an
ineffective Type B teacher were lucky enough to share students
with an exemplary reading teacher, for example, that Type B
teacher would be judged to be an excellent performer based on
that exemplary reading teacher’s good performance, despite the
Type B teacher’s own possibly ineffective teaching of his or her
own subject. Conversely, if a highly effective Type B teacher
were unlucky enough to share students with a particularly poor
reading teacher, the Type B teacher would be judged to be a
substandard teacher, despite that Type B teacher’s own possibly
excellent teaching performance. The only thing that the Type B
teacher would be able do in such a case would be to work the
back channels of her school administration to make sure that she
does not share any students with the poor reading teacher the
next year. This outcome manifestly would not serve the purpose
of “increasing student success” or “increasing student learning
73. See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 2.
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growth.” In fact, because it would incentivize not better
teaching but administrative gamesmanship, it would patently
work against that purpose.
Similar to the Type B teachers, the Type C teachers, who
were rated based on the overall aggregate performance of the
students in their schools, could not control or change the
characteristics of the schools into which they were assigned, and
they could not do anything to influence, for example, the quality
of the principal’s leadership, the school’s faculty-student ratio,
or the average years of experience of the teachers with whom
they taught—all non-teaching factors that might plausibly be
factors influencing the overall school score. So, if, for example,
a Type C teacher who was an exemplary classroom teacher were
recruited to a struggling school to teach disadvantaged students,
and she did a terrific job with her own students, but she did not
teach any FCAT-tested grade levels, she would nevertheless be
rated as a poor teacher if the FCAT scores of the students she
did not teach in the other grades were to fall short of their
predicted growth. The only thing that such a teacher would be
able to do in such circumstances would be to work the back
channels of administration to secure an assignment to a more
advantaged school. Once again, since it would incentivize
administrative gamesmanship rather than better teaching, this
outcome would be manifestly at odds with the ostensible state
goal of “increasing student success” or “increasing student
learning growth.”74
The District Court’s opinion elided these obvious problems
and judged to be “rational” a severely attenuated—one might
say fanciful—theory of causation that was squarely at odds with
both the purpose of value-added modeling and the evidence in
the record.75 This theory of causation held that the defendants
“could rationally believe” that, by contributing positively or
negatively to the overall learning environment of the school,
each teacher in a school would have effects on the performance
of their own students and that of other students in the school in
subjects and grades the teacher did not teach.76 It was therefore
74. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 71, at 19; Stewart, 28 F.
Supp. 3d at 1212.
75. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
76. Id.
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rational for the defendants to rate these Type B and Type C
teachers’ effectiveness based on student performance in subjects
and/or grades these teachers did not teach.77
Thus, the court’s theory of causation, which the State
defendants offered, but which the court devised on behalf of the
districts (which had not even moved for summary judgment
themselves), converted the theorized “spillover effect,” a
confounding factor for which value-added modeling is supposed
to control, into the independent variable in the analysis for the
Type B teachers.78 And it converted overall school-level student
achievement, another confounding factor for which the model
was supposed to control, into the independent variable for the
Type C teachers.79
Under the District Court’s reasoning, if the teacher
evaluation systems in the Districts were instead based on
increases and decreases in sales of healthy food in the school
lunchroom (either to the teacher’s own students or to the student
body as a whole), then it would be “rational” to hire, fire, tenure,
deny tenure to, or otherwise discipline the teachers based on
those sales because it is conceivable that one could rationally
believe that all teachers in a school should be promoting healthy
lifestyles, and that the healthier a student’s eating choices are,
the more likely that student will be ready, willing, and able to
learn—thereby improving student achievement. Obviously,
using such a method for rating teachers would be ridiculous, but
the Type B and Type C teachers had no more control over the
teaching of their colleagues in other grades and/or subjects than
they did over the sales abilities of the cafeteria staff in their
schools.
Considering the State’s purported justification for its valueadded model of improving student achievement by holding
teachers accountable for the test results they produce, it is
impossible to square the methods described above with that
goal. In fact, by holding teachers accountable for performance
they can influence only incidentally, if at all, the model as
applied to the Type B and Type C teachers worked directly
against this goal.
Moreover, the model adopted in the
77. Id. at 1212-14.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1211-15.
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defendants’ districts, which was adapted from a state-level
model carefully constructed by experts, directly violated the
assumptions these experts used to construct their model. At a
minimum, even under the current, very deferential approach to
rational basis review, adopting means that directly frustrate
one’s stated goals and underlying assumptions should have been
a bridge too far.

2. Legislating without Seeking Objective Expert
Information
More controversially, earlier approaches to rationality
review, such as those employed in the Lochner era, would not
only seek to know whether the means adopted to serve a
legitimate legislative end would instead frustrate that end, but
also whether the legislature had established, as a factual matter,
the need for the means it had chosen, and the effectiveness of
the chosen means at meeting the need. Based on the majority
opinion in Lochner, the failure of the New York legislature to do
so was what doomed its maximum hours law. 80 But here again,
against the challenge that the Florida legislature’s chosen use of
value-added modeling to judge one teacher’s effectiveness based
on the scores of another teacher’s students lacked support, the
court upheld the law.81
Measurement scholarship has established that between one
and fourteen percent of a student’s standardized test score gains
can be attributed to the effectiveness of the student’s teacher in
the tested subject based on value-added modeling, and that only
where careful controls are placed on the model. 82 However, no
scholarship whatsoever has established that any portion of a
student’s test score performance can be isolated and explained
by the teaching performance of teachers who do not teach that
student, or who do not teach the tested curriculum.
This lack of scholarly support is not surprising. The uses to
which the districts put Florida’s value-added model were
directly in conflict with the purpose of value-added modeling.83
80. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62-64 (1905).
81. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212-14 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
82. AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16.
83. Haertel Rep., supra note 14, at ¶ 57.
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One need not be a measurement expert to understand why there
is a complete lack of any scholarship even hinting at examining
the hypothesis that one employee’s performance can be assessed
based on the performance of a completely different employee
over whom the evaluated employee has no control or authority.
Scholars do not study these methods for the same reason they do
not evaluate whether to award a diploma to one student based on
another student’s standardized test scores, as in the vignette at
the beginning of this article—it is facially preposterous and
patently irrational to even consider doing that. Likewise, it is
preposterous to believe that one teacher can or should be held
accountable for the growth or lack thereof in test scores of
students they do not teach, or on tests given to assess a
curriculum they do not teach, and for which they do not claim
any expertise.
No rational school district would voluntarily adopt such a
system, no rational parents would choose to have their children’s
teachers evaluated in this manner, and no rational teacher would
choose to be evaluated in this way. The District Court even said
as much in the conclusion to its Order granting summary to the
State and districts:
The unfairness of the evaluation system as implemented is
not lost on this Court. We have a teacher evaluation system
in Florida that is supposed to measure the individual
effectiveness of each teacher. But as the Plaintiffs have
shown, the standards for evaluation differ significantly.
FCAT teachers are being evaluated using an FCAT VAM
that provides an individual measurement of a teacher’s
contribution to student improvement in the subjects they
teach. The FCAT VAM has been applied to Type B
teachers as well, but perversely it can only measure student
improvement in subjects not taught by the Type B teacher.
For Type C teachers the FCAT VAM has been applied as a
school-wide composite score that is the same for every
teacher in the school. It does not contain any measure of
student learning growth of the Type C teacher’s own
students. To make matters worse, the legislature has
mandated that teacher ratings be used to make important
employment decisions such as pay, promotion, assignment,
and retention. Ratings affect a teacher’s professional
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reputation as well because they are made public—they have
even been printed in the newspaper. Needless to say, this
Court would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would
find this evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let
alone be willing to submit to a similar evaluation system. 84

But in the next breath, the court stated, “[f]or reasons that
have been explained, the State Defendants could rationally
conclude that the evaluation policies further the state’s
legitimate interest in increasing student learning growth.”85
To recap, despite acknowledging that it would be difficult
to find a person who would themselves be willing to be
evaluated in this way, the court felt compelled to find that two
evaluation programs, one of which rated the performance of
teachers based on the test scores students they did not teach the
tested material, and the other of which rated their performance
based on the test scores of students they did not teach at all,
were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of
improving student achievement. Both of these rating plans
stood in direct conflict with both the purpose of the program and
the specifications of the model derived through hours of
professional work. Despite the fact that neither of these groups
of rated teachers received any information from the ratings that
they could individually use to improve their own teaching
practice, the courts held that the government “could rationally
believe” that so rating these teachers, and then attaching
potentially extreme consequences to the ratings, would
somehow improve student achievement. And under the law
today, these decisions were likely correct. So, why did the
District Court—and the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
rulings in all respects86— feel compelled to conclude that the
program was rationally related to a legitimate government
interest?

III. Rational Basis Review and the Lochner Recoil
The answer is the modern approach to rational basis
review. Review of legislation for whether it bears a rational
84. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1215-16.
85. Id. at 1216.
86. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1294 (2015).
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relationship to a legitimate legislative interest in the public
health, safety, welfare, or morals has been a feature of
constitutional law for a very long time. The traditional approach
to review of legislation under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment—what is generally referred to as
“substantive due process”—is exemplified by the cases decided
in what is now known as the “Lochner Era.”
Lochner v. New York, 87 a case so infamous as to have a
place in the “anticanon” 88
alongside such judicial
embarrassments as Korematsu v. United States89 and Dred Scott
v. Sandford,90 invalidated a New York law limiting the number
of hours a baker could be required to work to no more than sixty
per week.91 Today, the case is nearly universally reviled, chiefly
due to its recognition of a right to contract to sell one’s labor as
a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This recognition—which stemmed from cases
preceding Lochner, but was forcefully applied in Lochner—
allowed, or at that time required, the Court to examine the law as
a valid exercise of the police power of New York to regulate the
health, safety, morals, and welfare of its citizens. 92
In conducting its review, the Court considered the State’s
proffered justification that regulating the hours of weekly work
for a baker was an exercise of the power to regulate the public
health, the argument being that extended work in baking exposes
workers to a higher risk of respiratory ailments. 93 Stating its
role in reviewing such legislation where the liberty interest in
question is the liberty to enter into labor contracts, the Court set
forth that era’s version of rational basis review:
It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the
valid exercise of the police power by the State. There is no
dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise the
Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy and the
legislatures of the States would have unbounded power, and
87. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905).
88. For a detailed and careful treatment of the “anticanon,” which includes Lochner,
see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
89. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
90. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
91. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 50-51.
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it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation was
enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of
the people; such legislation would be valid, no matter how
absolutely without foundation the claim might be. The
claim of the police power would be a mere pretext —
become another and delusive name for the supreme
sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from
constitutional restraint. This is not contended for. In every
case that comes before this court, therefore, where
legislation of this character is concerned and where the
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the
question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is
it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may
seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of
himself and his family? Of course the liberty of contract
relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as
much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. 94

The Court did not mention anything about “fundamental”
rights,95 even though other courts of the era sometimes used that
adjective. 96 Following this statement, the Court analyzed the
State’s health-based justification and found a factual foundation
for it lacking:
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health
law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of
individuals, both employers and employes [sic], to make
contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may
think best, or which they may agree upon with the other
parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature of that under
review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent
men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome
interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are
not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are
94. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
96. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (“That the State may do
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically,
mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which
must be respected.”).
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passed in the exercise of the police power and upon the
subject of the health of the individual whose rights are
interfered with, unless there be some fair ground,
reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is material
danger to the public health or to the health of the employes
[sic], if the hours of labor are not curtailed.97

The emphasized portion above sets up the means-ends
scrutiny that is now familiar to any student of constitutional law,
but it sets up a particularly searching and skeptical version of it,
requiring the establishment of an objectively reasonable concern
that requires a legislative remedy of the type the legislature has
chosen—a concern that actually motivated the legislature’s
choice. 98
Rhetorically, at least, this test is not as far removed from
current approaches as the case’s status in the “anticanon” would
indicate. Nevertheless, it was not long before the Court chose to
abandon review of statutes for substantive reasonable necessity,
documented by facts presented and proved by the state
defendant, opting instead to establish a tiered form of scrutiny
based on which some rights could be deemed “fundamental,”
and therefore subject to searching judicial review, 99 while others
were left to a modern rationality review that was judicial review
in name only.
This move had earlier roots, but began in earnest with West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish100 and United States v. Carolene
97. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61 (1905) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 64.
99. Id.
100. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Contrary to most popular conceptions, the approach to
substantive due process reflected in Parrish did not differ materially from that reflected in
Lochner:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute
and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process.
Id. at 391. This formulation is broadly consistent with the means-ends scrutiny laid out by
the Lochner Court, which also required the legislation to have been adopted for a police
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Products, Inc, particularly its famous footnote 4,101 and found
its full expression in Griswold v. Connecticut.102 In Griswold,
the Court considered the continuing reach of Lochner and finally
issued a clear abrogation of the decision, beginning,
“[o]vertones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New
York, 198 U. S. 45, should be our guide. But we decline that
invitation . . .”103 The Court then drew the now-familiar line
between fundamental rights that qualify for searching judicial
review and other, more quotidian matters, stating, “[w]e do not
sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions,” before distinguishing the
contraception restriction at issue from such laws. 104 This

power-related interest and to be reasonably related to that interest. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 56, 61 (1905).
101. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The text of Footnote 4 is a significant break from
Lochner’s approach (and I would argue with Parrish’s, as well), as it begins the move
toward the more categorical and tiered approach to constitutional scrutiny that is dominant
today:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote; on restraints
upon the dissemination of information; on interferences with political
organizations; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious or national, or racial minorities :
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted). But as a decision, it holds that Congress indeed had a rational
legislative purpose for regulating filled milk, one reflected in the exhaustive work of
legislative staffers and debated in multiple committee hearings, and one that was reflected
in the statute itself. See id. at 148-49 (reviewing this evidence).
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. Id. at 481-82.
104. Id. at 482. Of course, this was a slight mischaracterization of judicial review
during the Lochner era, which did not purport to judge the “wisdom” or “propriety” of laws
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distinction had the permanent effect of dividing the task of
judicial review of laws for constitutionality into two tiers, a task
begun in the famous footnote from Carolene Products, but
cemented into our jurisprudence in Griswold.
Under the current tiered form of scrutiny that flows from
Carolene Products and Griswold, legislation that places burdens
on fundamental rights will be struck down unless the
government can establish that the legislation is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest.105 In contrast, mere
social and economic legislation that does not interfere with a
fundamental right will be upheld unless shown to lack “a
reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest.”106 This latter
test sounds quite similar to the Lochner era analysis, certainly
placing the burden of proof on the party seeking invalidation,
but also seeming to require an actual purpose motivating the
legislation, and a rational relationship between the means chosen
by the legislature and the purpose it pursues. But in modern
application, the standard is dramatically different.
Over time, the New Deal and post-New Deal Courts’
disapprovals of the outcome of Lochner, but retention of the
prospect of judicial review upon a showing of a law’s lack of
reasonable foundation or relationship to a legitimate end, has
morphed into what amounts to judicial abdication or abstention
from review entirely in most cases. The current approach had its
roots in Williamson v. Lee Optical,107 but found its full
expression in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc,108 an equal
protection case that has been understood to articulate the rational
basis standard that applies in substantive due process cases, as
well. 109
but did ask legislatures to justify the “need” for them to serve a legitimate interest
stemming from the police power. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
105. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215-16 (1982) (explaining the levels of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
106. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
107. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at
hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was
a rational way to correct it.”).
108. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
109. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (equating the two standards); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766 (setting forth the
rational basis test for substantive due process).
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Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in FCC, made clear
that the modern approach to rational basis review is not really a
doctrine of review at all, but closer to a qualified abstention
doctrine.110 Under this approach, which has been followed in
most federal court decisions since, a statute must be upheld
under rational basis review “if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.”111 The legislature does not have to proffer
such a justification—rather, the Court has the duty to imagine a
“conceivable state of facts” that could have motivated the
legislature.112 In addition, “those attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.’”113 Moreover, “it is
entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the
conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually
motivated the legislature,” because the Court “never insisted that
a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”114
In fact, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
factfinding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”115
Thus, under the current approach the courts have
developed, the court must uphold the legislation unless the
plaintiff invalidates any and all conceivable justifications for the
means chosen, whether real or imagined. The government does
not bear any burden of production or persuasion as to either the
ends it seeks to serve or the means it has chosen to serve such
ends.116 This extreme deference that courts now give to most
legislative enactments requires neither fact nor logic to sustain
their rationality—it even indulges judicial speculation of what a
legislature “could rationally believe,”117
without any

110. FCC, 508 U.S. at 313-14.
111. Id. at 313.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
364 (1973)).
114. Id. (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980)).
115. Id.
116. Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 897, 912 (2005).
117. Cook v. Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1213 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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requirement to even found that speculation in evidence of which
the legislature would have been aware at the time.
This regime, in its application if not its rhetoric, is
obviously a far cry from that of the Lochner era, and even, I
would argue, the era in which Lochner was initially
disapproved, and then rejected.118 It is also inconsistent with
any concept of judicial review stretching beyond abstention, and
it is worth asking whether we made a wrong turn in moving
quite so far away from that era’s constitutional norms. The
following section proposes a potential correction, focusing on
the salutary features of Lochner-era jurisprudence that need not
have been left behind in the effort to reject its problematic
implications for labor law and the New Deal.

IV. Reviving Rational Basis Review
The extreme, yet real and recent, example from Florida
above illustrates that rational basis review of substantive due
process claims has become little more than judicial abdication—
something more akin to the political question doctrine than an
actual doctrine of merits review. This Part makes the case for a
way forward, which turns out to be a way backward in
Constitutional law.
The examples of the absurdity of results that the current
approach to rational basis review produces are legion. Many
have been outlined in the careful work of constitutional lawyer
Clark Neily, 119 and others have been catalogued over the years
in other scholarship.120 Although not highlighted much in
discussions of the decision, Justice Marshall’s liberal dissent to
San Antonio v. Rodriguez also spends significant time criticizing
the too-lenient approach of the majority in reviewing Texas’s
property-tax-based school funding program for rationality. 121 In
particular, Justice Marshall outlines the lack of factual
118. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Parrish, Carolene
Products, and Griswold).
119. E.g., Neily, supra note 116, at 903-13.
120. E.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to be Free of
Arbitrary Legislation, 14 GEO. J. L. & PUB. P OL’Y 493, 503 (2016).
121. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (criticizing rigid tiered scrutiny, and arguing for more of a sliding scale of
review).
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foundation or logic underlying Texas’s purported justification of
preserving “local control” in relation to its chosen means of
funding education primarily through local property taxation,
which creates substantial inequalities in funding throughout the
state’s school districts, leaving wealthy districts with enough
funding to truly exercise local control, while saddling poor
districts with barely enough money to make a decent effort at
meeting the most basic of state standards. 122 In choosing to fight
on this ground and highlight the internal contradictions in
Texas’s school funding plan, Justice Marshall draws
substantially from the pre-FCC, and even pre-Griswold,
approach to rational basis review.
The decades-long move away from the Lochner era was a
well-intentioned one, which sought to preserve both the
expansions in worker protections that both preceded and
followed the Great Depression and to forestall opportunistic
challenges to New Deal and Great Society legislation. But it
overshot its mark. The proof of this overshooting lies in
decisions that nominally fell under the nearly absolute
deference-based standard articulated in FCC, but which
nevertheless came in for far more searching judicial review.
Beginning with Plyler v. Doe,123 the Court confronted a
case in which it had made clear less than a decade prior that
strict judicial scrutiny did not apply. 124 In Plyler, the statute
under challenge denied any public educational services to
undocumented immigrants residing in Texas. 125 The Court
quickly reaffirmed its holding in Rodriguez that education was
not a fundamental right for the purpose of due process or equal
protection analysis, but also made the point that it was not
equivalent to any ordinary social benefit either. 126 It also held
that undocumented immigration status could not be treated as a
suspect classification. 127 These two holdings should have
shunted the case into rational basis review territory. And
rhetorically, it did, as the Court referred to “rationality” in

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 126-28.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 223.
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preparing to conduct its review, but the Court also laid out a
particularly searching form of rationality review—one more
reminiscent of Lochner than FCC: “[i]n determining the
rationality of § 21.031, we may appropriately take into account
its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its
victims.”128
Upon a skeptical review, the Court rejected purported
justifications for the law based on national immigration
policy;129 conservation of scarce state resources;130 preventing
an influx of undocumented immigrants into the state;131 the
special burdens that undocumented immigrant children place on
state educational delivery; 132 and a lack of expected benefit to
the state due to the tendency of migrants to move around the
country.133 In most cases, the Court rejected these justifications
due to their lack of evidentiary support in the record.134 In short,
the Court, even though it applied rational basis review, actually
engaged in judicial review. Despite prior judicial protestations
to the contrary,135 the sky did not fall, and the legislature
adjusted, and then went right on legislating.
The Court went even further in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,136 rejecting the idea of a quasisuspect classification for the mentally disabled, and holding that
rational basis review would apply to a local ordinance placing
significant burdens on obtaining a permit to build a living center
for those with mental disabilities. 137 But even though the Court
selected this highly-deferential standard, it nevertheless upheld
the lower court’s decision striking down the ordinance, stating,
“[b]ecause in our view the record does not reveal any rational
basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any
128. Id. at 224.
129. Id. at 226.
130. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 227.
131. Id. at 228.
132. Id. at 229.
133. Id. at 230.
134. Id. at 224-30.
135. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973) (“Only by faithful adherence to this
guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative
branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.”)).
136. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
137. Id. at 446-47.
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special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, we affirm the
judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as
applied in this case.”138
Rather than imagining a rational basis that “could have”
motivated the adoption of the ordinance, the Court reviewed
what the city claimed actually motivated its adoption, and found
itself not convinced. 139 The Court ultimately held:
“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case
appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely
supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly
provided for by state and federal law.”140

Rejecting each of five different justifications the city
offered for the ordinance, the Court illustrated that judicial
skepticism of even claims of legitimate governmental ends is
warranted in at least some cases, even where fundamental rights
and suspect classifications are not at issue.
Perhaps these decisions can be explained by the fact that
they both pre-dated FCC and its articulation of the extremely
deferential approach in an authoritative way, or perhaps because
they were both equal protection cases, rather than substantive
due process cases. But FCC did not make any effort to abrogate
or overrule these cases, and the rational basis standard has long
been applied coextensively and consistently between equal
protection and substantive due process cases. They were also
followed by other rulings that nominally fell into the rational
basis category but wound up applying a more Lochner-like form
of rational basis review than one would have expected with FCC
on the books.141

138. Id. at 448.
139. Id. at 448-50.
140. Id. at 450.
141. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-35 (1996) (applying rational basis
review to invalidate a Colorado constitutional amendment for irrationally imposing
legislative disabilities on gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in local government); Quinn v.
Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (invalidating a property ownership requirement to sit on a
county land use board as an irrational classification). For a detailed treatment of all
Supreme Court cases since 1971 in which the Court has applied rational basis review in a
searching way more reminiscent of Lochner than FCC, see Note, Raphael Holoszyc-
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Based on the discussion above, the level of judicial
deference reflected in FCC, and in the Florida suit challenging
aberrant uses of value-added modeling, is neither obligatory on
the courts nor uniquely preservative of the separation of powers.
This means that there is no real principled basis to consign the
substantive due process method of the Lochner era to the trash
heap. Rather, we should reconsider at least requiring some level
of means-ends connection, presumed to exist absent a challenge,
but able to be put at issue by a plaintiff bearing a burden of
proof. Only this burden should be one actually possible to meet
through documentable fact, expert testimony, legislative history,
etc., that negatives the connection between the asserted goal and
the means chosen to meet it, or through some other showing that
this ends-means relationship was not actually the basis for a
challenged piece of legislation. Had this opportunity been
available to the plaintiffs in Cook v. Stewart, it is likely that at
least one, and perhaps both, groups of teachers would have
prevailed. The plaintiffs in San Antonio v. Rodriguez would
have had a road to victory, as well, not to mention the scores of
individuals seeking to operate businesses that present no danger
to the public, and who are burdened by restrictions on their right
to earn a living that have no connection to public health, safety,
or welfare.142
I have argued in the past that, under both the United States
Constitution and every state constitution, government stands in a
fiduciary capacity in relation to the people. 143 Others have also
claimed that, in our republican form of government, we delegate
to our elected officials the power to act on our behalf, and in
accepting that delegation and power, they assume the duty to act
in our best interests, and to do so both faithfully and
rationally. 144
Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 2070, 2106-17 (2015).
142. For a thorough sampling of such individuals, see Neily, supra note 116.
143. Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education,
48 GA. L. REV. 949, 986-87 (2014); Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 705 (2012) [hereinafter Education Duty].
144. See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis
Inquiry and the Federal Government’s Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1385, 1405 (2017)
(arguing for fiduciary duty as the basis of rational basis review); Sotirios A. Barber, Are
Professors Lawson and Seidman Serious about a “Fiduciary Constitution”?, 69 FLA. L.
REV.
F.
10,
11
(2017),
http://www.floridalawreview.com/issue/volume-69/
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Some who agree with this claim place rational basis review
within the duty of due care, on the theory that fiduciaries assume
a baseline duty to act rationally as to their entrusted work.145
This conception would seem to support something more than the
rational basis review of today—but not much more. The duty of
care in other fiduciary contexts is typically enforced through
some form of process-based review, with the overall rationality
of the decision not being directly questioned. Accordingly, I see
the duty of care as more fitted to the limited circumstances in
which a legislature or other government actor assumes a positive
duty to act, such as under state constitutional education
clauses. 146 My own work places all individual negative rights
enforcement under the duty of loyalty. 147 In the absence of
specified duties to legislate on particular matters, such as
education in the states, legislative duty stems from its
discretionary power to legislate—or not legislate.
But
understanding that legislative positions are delegations of
authority from the public, not patronages or sinecures for
personal enrichment, means that legislatures cannot legislate
beyond the background basis for their delegated power.
Underlying this power is the background duty to legislate in the
best interests of the entrusting public—to have a public purpose
for legislating, and to legislate in a way that is directed is
serving that purpose.
This bedrock requirement is what forms the basis of the
“police power”—the starting point of all rational basis review of
state action during the Lochner era. An act that either legislates
outside of the police power, or uses the police power
oppressively, pretextually, or in a self-dealing way, is therefore
an act that is disloyal to the beneficiary of the legislative duty—
the public. If this is so, and it seems abundantly clear in both the

[https://perma.cc/KDR6-QRHX] (“Indeed, a fiduciary constitution would seem to compel
substantive reasonableness for any governmental act. No mentally competent person
would voluntarily delegate power to an agent to be exercised carelessly or pretextually or
for anything less than an understanding and reasonably competent pursuit of the principal’s
interest.”).
145. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 144, at 1404-07.
146. Education Duty, supra note 143, at 747-48.
147. Education Duty, supra note 143, at 747-48.
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founding documents and their influences, 148 then the courts are
on sound footing reviewing legislation for substantive
rationality. Indeed, given their role and their co-equal status as
public fiduciaries, the courts themselves likely have their own
fiduciary duties to engage in such review, and to do so in a
searching way. 149 Reviewing—actually reviewing—legislation
for whether it is rationally directed to serve a proper legislative
purpose is therefore the proper and legitimate role for the courts,
one they have abdicated over time by gradually ratcheting down
the standards for legislative rationality.

Conclusion
Some may view the current practice of rational basis
review as a correct reflection of the extreme deference that
courts should afford legislative acts, exemplified by the common
state constitutional law refrain that legislation should not be
invalidated unless its unconstitutionality is shown “beyond a
reasonable doubt.”150 Others might posit that the staying power
of rational basis review, as practiced in the modern era, is
justified by a fear of re-Lochnering the Constitution.151 But we
do not have to love Lochner itself to seek to restore its mode of
rational basis review.
My project here has not been to apologize for or defend the
outcome of the Lochner decision itself. I have my own views as
148. See, e.g., EVAN FOX -DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE : THE STATE AS
FIDUCIARY 28-51 (2011); GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND
PROPER CLAUSE 56–57 (2010); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal
Authority, 31 QUEEN’S L.J. 259, 260–61 (2005); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of
Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 120 (2006); Sung Hui Kim, The Last
Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against
Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 903-04 (2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013).
149. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 714 (2013) (identifying the fiduciary conception of
judging underlying the founding documents, establishing the duty to, among other things,
“keep[] the legislature within its bounded authority”).
150. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual
Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 302, 358 (2011)
(describing the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of constitutionality).
151. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 37386 (2003) (carefully working through the arguments as to why Lochner was wrongly
decided, in an effort to harmonize its rejection with current constitutional law).
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to why it was wrongly decided, and those can be better
expressed in an article more focused on that topic. My concern
here has been with the methodology of Lochner, not its result.
Using an exemplar case coming out of the education context, I
have sought to show how, in rejecting a decision that we can
probably all agree came out the wrong way, we also rejected the
public-protective, and therefore proper, role for the courts as a
check on legislative action that is irrational, protectionist, rentenabling, harmful to public servants, or otherwise contrary to the
public interest—one that has worked well in many cases other
than Lochner. 152 Correcting that error is as easy as privileging
precedents such as Plyler and Cleburne over those such as FCC.
It’s high time we considered that.

152. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing Plyler, Cleburne,
and Lawrence). For an illuminating historical discussion of the Lochner era cases that
upheld public protective legislation—even workplace restrictions—against constitutional
challenges, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 51 (U. Chi. Press 2011).

